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1  | INTRODUC TION
A sharp decline in oil prices in Spring 2014 may have heralded the dawn of a new era of relatively low oil prices – 
occasional short- lived rallies notwithstanding. A structural shift has occurred in oil markets – due to alternative 
sources of supply, declining energy- intensity of output and muted demand due to global economic deceleration 
and fear of impending global recession. Thus, Brent prices have declined from their 2014 peak of $115 per barrel 
to a level of around $60– $70 in 2019 and near $50 by the end of 2020. New waves of geopolitical strife have failed 
to bring oil prices above these levels, and we can argue that current prices include a geopolitical risk premium that 
may be excessive. In the event, the OPEC cartel's oil- market power has declined substantially, even in cooperation 
with Russia, in large part due to actual and potential tight oil production from North America. Setbacks in global 
environmental reforms notwithstanding, the effects of climate change and rising awareness in civil society are 
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Abstract
We investigate the effects of low oil prices and heightened 
geopolitical risks on economic growth and investment in 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries. We find 
that negative shocks to oil prices and positive shocks to geo-
political risk have adverse effects on GDP and investment. 
Moreover, we find that the impact of investment on GDP in 
MENA countries is muted when oil prices are low and/or ge-
opolitical risk level is high. These findings cast doubts on the 
prospects of mega- project economic transformation plans 
as envisioned in 2030 visions for several MENA countries.
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likely further to contribute to increased energy efficiency in production and pursuit of cleaner sources of energy. 
Thus, despite heightened geopolitical risk and futures market speculation fueled by massive financial liquidity in-
jections from central banks, oil prices have remained below the levels required for major oil producers to balance 
their budgets. Even major oil supply disruptions during 2019, which have affected Saudi Arabia, Iran, and 
Venezuela,1 have merely led to temporary blips in oil prices.2
Therefore, there is little doubt that the golden age of oil has passed, and major oil exporters are thus finding 
new urgency to diversify their economies. This urgency is not new in itself, as the need for diversification, and 
plans to bring it about, have been a staple of MENA oil- exporter policy programs for decades. An old joke from 
the 1990s was popular among analysts: At $40 per barrel, MENA exporters said that “reform was essential and 
urgent,” at $70 per barrel, they thought that “reform was important but had to wait,” and at $90 per barrel, they 
asked “what reform?” However, MENA oil exporters recognize that this episode of low oil prices is different from 
earlier ones: While estimates of the year that oil demand will peak may differ, they all agree that the peak is not 
too far into the future, and even if oil prices were to rise dramatically due to major synchronized production dis-
ruptions, such episodes will likely be mild and short lived.
Unfortunately, earlier attempts to diversify MENA economies, which were initiated during low- oil- price ep-
isodes, have resulted mainly in construction- intensive “white elephant” projects, which have left behind hugely 
underutilized industrial and educational cities, and the like. A new wave of economic reform and transformation 
plans have been announced in various MENA countries. Those plans are best known as 2030 visions in Saudi 
Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar and United Arab Emirates (and vision 2035 in Kuwait). The objectives of those plans have 
been admirable: Bahrain's 2030 vision aims to double household disposable income and diversify the economy. In 
addition to aiming to achieve sustainable growth rates, Qatar's 2030 vision aims also to reduce the country's de-
pendence on hydrocarbon industries gradually. Likewise, Kuwait's 2035 aims to develop a diversified economy to 
reduce the country's dependence on oil export revenues. Saudi Arabia aims to reduce the rate of unemployment 
from 11.6 to 7 percent and increase the share of non- oil exports in GDP. UAE's 2030 vision aims to reduce GDP 
volatility through diversification. Egypt, a relatively more diversified economy but still dependent on petrodollars 
recycled through real- estate investment and remittances from oil- rich countries, has also announced its own 2030 
economic development plan.
The main ingredient in most of these economic development plans, like all preceding ones during the 1990s 
and earlier, has been to boost growth and wean economies away from oil dependence through massive invest-
ments, mainly in infrastructure mega- projects. Like the white elephant projects of previous decades, there has 
been virtually no coordination to develop regional diversification that may lead to greater intra- regional trade that 
enhances growth prospects, c.f. El- Gamal (2016). Without the latter, the hope to attract foreign investors in sec-
tors that are not directly or indirectly tied to oil and gas is likely to prove as fanciful as it had in the past. Without 
high oil prices, availability of cheap capital is declining in the region, which reduces the incentive for foreign in-
vestors to bring their funds to the region with expectations of cheap leverage to boost returns. Simultaneously, 
heightened geopolitical risk and potential for political instability have been push factors driving investors away 
from the region, c.f. Abdel- Latif (2019).
In this paper, we provide quantitative assessments of the prospects for mega investment projects to boost 
economic growth in the MENA region.3 We use a quarterly dataset of 53 countries, including 15 MENA countries, 
over the period 1979Q1– 2017Q2. We build on our earlier work, c.f. Abdel- Latif and El- Gamal (2020), using a global 
 1The US sanctions on crude sales from Venezuela cut its oil exports by a third in 2019; see https://www.reute rs.com/artic le/us- venez uela- oil- expor 
ts- idUSK BN1Z627P.
 2Average crude oil price in 2019 was US$64/bbl which is $7/bbl lower than that of 2018. The 2019 Brent oil price has also evolved within narrower 
price ranges (between $55/bbl and $75/bbl) compared to recent years, and price by the end of 2020 was near $50/bbl.
 3Many of the world's most oil- reliant countries reside in the MENA region, and these include Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Libya, Iran.
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vector autoregression (GVAR) model in which countries are linked through bilateral trade, and in which we had 
modelled spillovers and common shocks explicitly. In the current study, focused on shorter- term effects of low oil 
prices and heightened geopolitical risk, we use a different set of sign restrictions to identify differentially oil price 
reductions that are due to increased supply or reduced demand, which we describe in detail in the next section. 
Specifically, we study how investment and GDP in MENA countries are affected by the likely events of negative 
shocks to oil prices and/or positive geopolitical shocks.
We further study the direct relationship between investment and GDP growth in MENA countries in order to 
assess the likelihood of vision 2030 mega- projects producing the non- energy- sector growth that they promise. 
Toward that end, we supplement the analysis of traditional impulse response functions (IRFs) from the global 
VAR model with a set of regime- specific local projections IRFs (LPIRFs), fusing the methodology outlined in Jordà 
(2005) by estimating the parameters sequentially at each point of interest. This technique is known to be robust 
to model misspecification and can accommodate model nonlinearity, c.f. Barnichon and Brownlees (2019). We use 
it to divide the data into two regimes each of low versus high oil prices and/or low versus high geopolitical risk. 
Of particular interest will be the LPIRFs that allow us to study the effects of investment on GDP growth during 
periods of low oil price and high geopolitical risk.
We have argued substantively that the effect of investment on GDP growth is enhanced during periods of 
high oil prices by low cost of capital that invites foreign investors, and depressed during periods of low oil prices 
when capital is not as cheap in local markets. We have further argued that periods of heightened geopolitical risk 
and potential political instability are likely to drive foreign investors away from regional markets. Thus, we expect 
that periods of low oil prices and heightened geopolitical risk will be particularly bad for the return on the mega- 
project investments envisioned in various countries' visions 2030. Our empirical findings confirm that a negative 
shock to oil prices causes GDP and investment levels to fall, regardless whether the price decline was driven by 
demand or supply forces. A positive shock to the level of geopolitical risk has the same effect, leading to decline in 
GDP and investment in MENA countries. Furthermore, a positive shock to country- level investment has no effect 
on GDP for any MENA country if it coincides with a simultaneous incidence of negative shock to oil prices and 
positive shock to geopolitical risk. Finally, our LPIRFs show that the effects of investment changes on GDP growth 
are likely to be muted during sustained periods of low oil prices and/or high geopolitical risk. Therefore, empirical 
evidence suggests that potential success of MENA countries' visions 2030 is highly unlikely.
2  | DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Our dataset consists of quarterly data from the first quarter of 1979 to the second quarter of 2017 for the 53 
countries listed in Table A1. The variables of interest are GDP, investment, oil price, oil production and a measure 
of geopolitical risk described below. While GDP and investment are country level series, the rest of the variables 
are at the global level. We used industrial production as a proxy for GDP. For country level investment series, we 
used gross capital formation. To construct the weighting matrix described in Section 2.1, we used official bilateral 
trade data from the directions of trade statistics (DOTS) of the IMF. For oil price, we used Brent price of crude oil 
(in USD per Barrel). To measure geopolitical risk, we used the GPR index constructed by Caldara and Iacoviello 
(2016) based on news article data.
We construct a multi- country GVAR model to study the effects of oil price and geopolitical shocks on country 
GDP and investment levels. We impose a set of sign restrictions to differentiate between oil price declines re-
sulting from supply versus demand factors, and study the effects of geopolitical risk changes. GVAR models have 
been used in several studies to model spillover effects as well as oil price shocks – see, for example, Bettendorf 
(2017); Abdel- Latif and El- Gamal (2019), and the references therein. In addition to the GVAR results, we also es-
timate a set of non- linear IRFs to study the effects of investment changes on GDP in four distinct regimes of low 
versus high oil prices and low versus high geopolitical risk. This modeling approach was used in Barnichon and 
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Brownlees (2019) to investigate the impacts of monetary shocks on economic growth. In this section, we sum-
marize the main features of our GVAR model and non- linear LP- IRFs approach. Empirical results from estimating 
these models are reported in Section 3.
2.1 | Global VAR model
We employ a global VAR model that accommodates country- specific domestic and foreign variables along with 
common shocks to oil prices or geopolitical risk. The model is built upon a sequence of N + 1 country- specific 
VARX models, where X represents a set of weighted averaged foreign variables in addition to any global vari-
ables. A typical VARX model for country i  includes the following variables: Real GDP and investment (as domestic 
variables), weighted averages of GDP and investment in other countries in the system, and unweighted global 
(common) variables, which are oil price, oil production, and geopolitical risk. Country- specific foreign variables 
and global variables are assumed to be weakly exogenous in country i  model. Country i  VARX models can be 
presented formally as follows:
where Aij, (j = 1,…, p) are ki × ki coefficient matrices, Bis, (s = 0,…, q) are ki × k
∗
i
 coefficient matrices associated with 
the weakly exogenous variables in the model, and it are ki × 1 vectors of idiosyncratic serially uncorrelated country- 
specific shocks with a variance- covariance matrix 
∑
it. Country- specific foreign variables are constructed using a bilat-
eral trade based weight matrix it as follows:
We assume that geopolitical risk and oil prices are endogenous in the US model and that oil production is endogenous 
in the Saudi model. As possessor of the world's largest economy and military, the US foreign policy can unilaterally affect 
global economics and politics.4 The active role the US plays in shaping the geopolitics of the MENA region is another reason 
for our chosen specification.5 Thus, it is reasonable to include geopolitical risk as an endogenous variable in the US model 
while treating it as weakly exogenous in other countries' models. Moreover, the US is the world's top oil consumer (see 
Figure A1 in the Appendix A) and therefore has a significant influence on oil demand and prices. Cashin et al. (2014) incor-
porate oil price as endogenous in the US model of their GVAR application for the same reason. On the oil supply front, 
Mohaddes and Pesaran (2016) show that a negative shock to Saudi oil output would have significant impacts on global real 
output and financial markets. They show that a disruption to Saudi oil supply can not be compensated by other producers 
who are producing at or near capacity. Therefore, we treat oil production as an endogenous variable in the Saudi model. 
The GVAR model is estimated on a country- by- country basis, and parameter estimates are stacked, based on the weight 
matrix, into a single ‘global’ VAR model,6 which can be used to study the effects of different shocks in the system, which 



















ijxit, for i ∈ 0,…,N
 4The state power index, which ranks 168 countries according to different dimensions (security policy, diplomacy, defense, and culture), places the 
US as the most powerful country in the world, c.f. http://index.ineur opa.pl/en/.
 5The US has military bases and deployed troops across the MENA region (in Bahrain, Djibouti, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Turkey and United Arab Emirates). The recent unilateral US decision to kill Iranian Major General Soleimani, which continues to fuel 
geopolitical risk a year later, is a clear example of how US foreign policy and actions can shake up the whole region and elevate geopolitical risk.
 6In this sense, the GVAR model can be seen as a massive (or global) VAR model.
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IRFs obtained from the GVAR model offer a powerful analytical tool that tracks the responses of a system's 
variables to ‘impulses’ that are one- time shocks to other variables. In this regard, it is essential to identify the 
shocks correctly in order to interpret the IRFs meaningfully. Moreover, previous research has emphasized the 
importance of disentangling supply- and demand- driven shocks when studying oil price impacts. For the sake of 
identification, several research papers have relied on a priori assumptions either concerning contemporaneous 
dynamics (zero restrictions) or qualitative outcomes (sign restrictions). For example, Kilian (2009) estimated a 
structural VAR model imposing zero restrictions on instantaneous effects to identify supply and demand shocks 
assuming a vertical short- run supply curve. In another study, Kilian and Murphy (2014) employed a structural VAR 
with a combination of theoretically motivated sign restrictions and bounds on price elasticities to disentangle 
different types of oil price shocks. To differentiate between oil demand and supply shocks, Herwartz and Plödt 
(2016) adopted a different identification approach based on a priori assumptions concerning the shock generating 
distributions (i.e., statistical identification). In this paper, structural IRFs were found to be similar to those pro-
duced using zero and sign restrictions.7
Cashin et al. (2014) introduced the approach that we follow in this paper. They showed that sign restrictions 
can be used for shock identification within a GVAR framework. We apply sign restrictions to the IRFs obtained 
from our GVAR model to craft four scenarios and trace their impacts on country- level GDP and investment: (i) a 
positive shock to geopolitical risk; (ii) a supply- driven negative oil price shock; (iii) a demand- driven negative oil 
price shock, and (iv) a positive shock to country- level investment. Our primary focus is on scenarios in which oil 
prices fall and geopolitical risk rises. Thus, the first set of sign restrictions includes (a) a rise in geopolitical risk 
(GPR > 0), (b) a fall in oil production (qoil < 0), and (c) an increase in the oil price (poil > 0). The second group of 
sign restrictions is constructed as (d) an increase in oil supply (qoil > 0) and (e) a drop in the oil price (poil < 0). The 
third shock is identified as a result of the demand curve shift to the left where (e) oil price falls (poil < 0) and (f) oil 
production falls (qoil < 0). Finally, the fourth set of restrictions mimic a situation where country- level investment 
increases (> 0) while the level of geopolitical risks increase (GPR > 0) and oil price falls (poil < 0). The last scenario is 
similar to the recent and continuing environment in which 2030 visions have been formed and pursued. In plotting 
our results, we follow the example of Fry and Pagan (2011) by reporting the single model for which IRFs are closest 
to median values of the impulse vector (i.e., median target).
2.2 | Country- specific state- dependent IRFs
We investigate the asymmetric impacts of investment on GDP growth in times of low oil prices and high geopo-
litical risk. We estimate a set of local projection (LP) IRFs proposed by Jordà (2005). The LP- IRFs are more robust 
even when a (linear) VAR is misspecified. They also allow for a regime change either by using dummy variables or 
by computing state probabilities with a logistic function. The LPIRFs in their linear from can be obtained by esti-
mating the following set of OLS regressions for each forecast horizon.
where Λ are parameter matrices for lag p and forecast horizon h. uh
t+ h
 are autocorrelated and/or heteroscedastic dis-
turbances. Λh
1
 is the slope coefficients matrix which represents the response of xt+h to a reduced form innovation in 
time t. The structural IRFs are then estimated as follows:
 7Herwartz and Plödt (2016) find weak global demand and reduced precautionary demand for oil explain the drop in oil prices in 2008 and 2014.






, h = 0, 1,…,H − 1
(4)ÎR(t, h,di) = Λh1di
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where di = Λ− 10 . The shock matrix di can be identified from a linear VAR model. Since that the errors u
h
t+ h
 are serially 
correlated, we estimate robust standard errors using the approach of Newey and West (1987).
Because we are interested in comparing the effects of investment on GDP growth in times of low oil prices and 
heightened geopolitical risk, we apply the nonlinear form of the LPIRFs. The framework in Equations (3) and (4) 
can be extended easily to accommodate a non- linear form. We follow Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) who 
compute state probabilities using the following logistic function:
zt is normalized so that 𝛾 > 0 is scale- invariant. The observations for the two regimes are the product of the 
transition function and the endogenous variables:




= I and Γ̂
0
1,R2






 are obtained from the following LPs:
with h = 0,…,H − 1.
3  | EFFEC TS OF POSITIVE GEOPOLITIC AL AND NEGATIVE OIL 
PRICE SHOCKS
While the GVAR estimation that we conducted for this paper has included data for the 53 countries listed in 
Table A1, we report only the IRFs and LP- IRFs for the 15 MENA countries in our sample, which are the substantive 
focus of our study: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and Turkey. Clearly, this list includes both major energy exporters and others. 
In this regard, we have seen in our earlier GVAR analysis that oil prices and geopolitical risk have significant effects 
on GDP and investment in both oil exporting and other regional economies, c.f. Abdel- Latif and El- Gamal (2020).
We first report IRF results on the effects of positive shocks to geopolitical risk on GDP and investment in 
MENA countries. The IRFs for the effect of heightened geopolitical risk on GDP are plotted in Figure 1. They show 
that a one- time shock to geopolitical risk has a statistically significant adverse effect on GDP for all countries in 
the region for roughly five quarters, with some exceptions, such as Oman, for which the negative effect seems 
to be more persistent. Moreover, the negative effect on GDP is generally stronger in magnitude for oil exporting 
countries, albeit also substantial in secondary recipients of petrodollar receipts through workers' remittances, e.g. 



















Regime1 (R1) : xt− × (1−F(zt−1)), =1,…, p,




























     |  7ABDEL- LATIF AnD EL- GAMAL
The next set of IRFs, showing the effect of a positive shock to geopolitical risk on investment for each country, 
are shown in Figure 2. The pattern is generally similar to the effect of geopolitical shock on GDP, with statistically- 
significant negative effects on investment lasting approximately between 5 and 10 quarters in most countries. 
The notable exception to this duration of the negative effect is Israel, for which the statistically- negative impact 
on investment lasts longer than 10 quarters. It is also notable that the magnitude of the negative effect on invest-
ment is relatively small in major oil exporters, such as Saudi Arabia, reflecting the pattern that we have discussed 
F I G U R E  1   GDP response to a positive GPR shock. Figure shows the (sign restricted) GDP impulse response 
function to a one standard deviation shock to geopolitical risk index. The solid lines depict median (black color) 
and median target (gray color) impulse responses with 95% bootstrapped confidence bounds over quarterly time 
horizon. The impacts are in percentage points
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in the introduction, for those countries to boost investment in the hope of boosting non- oil GDP. This is the same 
pattern that is now being replicated at a larger scale in vision 2030 mega- project plans.8
 8It should be noted that the GPR shock documented here is a global (common) geopolitical shock. It would have been interesting to include 
country- specific geopolitical risk and implement a shock to individual country GPR equations and trace its effects on other countries in the region. 
However, country- level GPR indices for MENA region countries are only available for Saudi Arabia and Turkey. As a sensitivity analysis, we have 
re- estimated our GVAR model, including country- specific GPR index in Turkey and Saudi Arabia equations while treating this variable as missing in 
other individual country equations. We found that country- specific GPR shocks in Saudi Arabia and Turkey did not seem to result in statistically 
significant growth or investment impacts in other countries in the region. We attribute these results to the modest levels of intra- region trade 
linkages. We omit plots from this analysis for space consideration, but they are available upon request.
F I G U R E  2   Investment response to a positive GPR shock. Figure shows the (sign restricted) investment 
impulse response function to a one standard deviation positive shock to geopolitical risk index. The solid lines 
depict median (black color) and median target (gray color) impulse responses with 95% bootstrapped confidence 
bounds over quarterly time horizon. The impacts are in percentage points
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We now turn to the IRFs for the effects of a negative oil price shock on MENA country GDP and investment 
levels. The first set of results, plotted in Figure 3, show the effect of a demand- driven negative oil shock on GDP. 
The effect is again systematic throughout the region: Approximately 5 quarters of statistically- significantly lower 
GDP following a demand- driven negative shock to oil prices. Moreover, the magnitude of this effect is approxi-
mately the same, percentage- wise, for all countries in the region.
F I G U R E  3   GDP response to a demand- driven negative oil shock. Figure shows the (sign restricted) GDP 
impulse response function to a one standard deviation (demand- driven) oil price negative shock. The solid lines 
depict median (black color) and median target (gray color) impulse responses with 95% bootstrapped confidence 
bounds over quarterly time horizon. The impacts are in percentage points
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Next, we consider the IRFs for the effects of a negative oil price shock on investment, which are plotted in 
Figure 4. Again, we find that the effect of a negative oil price shock on investment is uniformly negative and 
statistically significant for about 5– 10 quarters in all MENA countries in the sample. Moreover, the magnitude 
of the negative response of investment to demand- driven negative oil price shock is approximately the same, 
percentage- wise, for most regional countries, with the notable exception of Qatar, for which the percentage im-
pact is approximately double that for other countries.
We now turn to supply- driven negative shocks to oil prices. Figures 5 and 6, respectively, show plots of the 
IRFs of GDP and investment to such shocks. The results in those two figures are generally very similar to their 
counterparts for demand- driven negative oil- price shocks, which are shown in Figures 3 and 4, respectively. This 
is consistent with the results of Caldara et al. (2019), who find that supply and demand shocks play an equally 
important role in explaining oil price and quantity changes.
We conclude that the negative effects on regional countries' GDP and investment levels do not vary by the 
type of oil shock (demand vs. supply driven), which is consistent with our explanation in Abdel- Latif and El- Gamal 
(2020) – that the effect works in large part through petrodollars and their marginal effect on global financial li-
quidity. Combining the sets of results for IRFs for positive geopolitical risk or negative oil price shock thus yields 
the result that both investment and GDP have suffered from either shock, and, therefore, the effects on invest-
ment and GDP are likely to be particularly severe in the current regime of low oil prices and heightened geopolit-
ical risk, both of which contribute negative disincentives for international investors.
Finally, we use the IRFs obtained from our GVAR model to examine the impact of a shock to country- specific 
investment on its GDP growth. We are particularly interested in a case where investment increases, oil prices 
fall, and geopolitical risk rises. Figure 7 shows the GDP impulse response functions for a positive shock to 
country- level investment subject to negative sign restrictions on oil prices and positive sign restrictions on geo-
political risk. The GDP responses seem to be statistically insignificant, albeit positive, in all MENA countries 
except Lebanon.
The current regime, however, is characterized less by negative shocks to oil prices and positive shocks to 
geopolitical risk, and more by prolonged periods of low oil prices and heightened geopolitical risk. Moreover, 
previous research has shown evidence of asymmetric impacts of oil price shocks (Çatık and Önder (2013), Malikov 
(2016), and Abdel- Latif et al. (2018)). For example, Malikov (2016) used a nonparametric IRF- density- based test to 
study asymmetries in dynamic impulse responses of macroeconomic aggregates to positive and negative oil price 
shocks. Therefore, we need to supplement our analysis by conducting local projections, as discussed in Section 2, 
for regimes of sustained low oil prices and heightened geopolitical risk. We turn to this exercise in the following 
section.
4  | COUNTRY- SPECIFIC REGIME SWITCHING IRFS
We first report the local projection IRFs (LPIRFs) for the effect of a boost in investment on GDP under low versus 
high oil price regimes. The LPIRFs for MENA countries under the two regimes are shown in Figure 8. For each 
country, the two plots represent LPIRFs under high oil prices in the top graph and low oil prices in the bottom 
graph.
For Algeria, Bahrain, UAE, Kuwait, and to some extent Iran, a positive shock to investment results in a signifi-
cant and sustained jump in GDP during times of high oil prices. For Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Oman, Tunisia 
and Turkey, the effect of a positive investment shock on GDP is still positive during periods of high oil prices, but 
much more muted than the effect shown in the previous group of oil exporters. During periods of low oil prices, 
the effect of a positive shock to investment on GDP is mostly statistically insignificant, and negative for the few 
cases where it is significant (e.g. in the case of Egypt with long lag or Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Qatar with short 
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lags). Consequently, we can conclude that countercyclical boosts to investment during periods of low oil prices 
have not had a positive effect on GDP, as vision 2030 plans had hoped they would.
The LPIRFs for responses of GDP to positive shocks in investment for each country under low (bottom graph) 
and high (top graph) levels of geopolitical risk are shown in Figure 9. The results show that during periods of 
low geopolitical risk, a positive shock to investment can have a statistically significant positive effect on GDP in 
F I G U R E  4   Investment response to a demand- driven negative oil shock. Figure shows the (sign restricted) 
investment impulse response function to a one standard deviation (demand- driven) oil price negative shock. The 
solid lines depict median (black color) and median target (gray color) impulse responses with 95% bootstrapped 
confidence bounds over quarterly time horizon. The impacts are in percentage points
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Algeria, UAE, Iran, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. However, during periods of high geopolitical 
risk, all countries with the exception of Israel show either negative or statistically insignificant effects of a positive 
shock to investment on GDP.
Therefore, combining the results from Figures 8 and 9, we conclude that boosts in investment during peri-
ods of low oil prices and/or high geopolitical risk are most likely not to result in the positive effect on GDP that 
F I G U R E  5   GDP response to supply- driven negative oil price shock. Figure shows the (sign restricted) GDP 
impulse response function to a one standard deviation (supply- driven) oil price negative shock. The solid lines 
depict median (black color) and median target (gray color) impulse responses with 95% bootstrapped confidence 
bounds over quarterly time horizon. The impacts are in percentage points
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vision 2030 plans of various countries suggest they would. Given that the most likely scenario in the short to 
medium term is a combination of relatively low oil prices and heightened geopolitical risk, we have shown that 
the results from our estimated GVAR model support our substantive argument in the introduction that artifi-
cially boosting investment in MENA countries is highly unlikely to succeed in generating diversified economic 
growth.
F I G U R E  6   Investment response to a supply- driven negative oil price shock. Figure shows the (sign restricted) 
GDP impulse response function to a one standard deviation (supply- driven) oil price negative shock. The solid 
lines depict median (black color) and median target (gray color) impulse responses with 95% bootstrapped 
confidence bounds over quarterly time horizon. The impacts are in percentage points
14  |     ABDEL- LATIF AnD EL- GAMAL
5  | CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has aimed to assess the economic prospects of 2030 economic transformation visions through mega- 
investment projects under the current regime of low oil prices and heightened geopolitical risk. Unfortunately, 
many countries in the MENA region continue to subscribe to the long- discredited idea that it is sufficient to boost 
investment in any form in order to generate growth. This misguided hope ignores diminishing returns, crowding 
F I G U R E  7   GDP response to a positive shock to country level investments. Figure shows the country- level 
GDP impulse response function to a one standard deviation shock to country level investment. The solid lines 
depict median (black color) and median target (gray color) impulse responses with 95% bootstrapped confidence 
bounds over quarterly time horizon. The impacts are in percentage points
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out of private investment, and a host of other well understood principles of economic development (see 
Easterly, 2001). It may be tempting as political rhetoric to convince regional populations that they do not have to 
get poorer in the medium term, but it does, in fact, make matters worse. In a recent blog post, we have argued that 
the current mega- project agendas are similar to someone kicking frantically while caught in quicksand.9 Thus, we 
have argued that regional countries would be advised better to conserve their savings, instead of squandering 
 9See https://thefo rum.erf.org.eg/2018/01/16/youre - stuck - quick sand- stop- kicki ng/.
F I G U R E  8   LPIRFs of GDP in response to 1SD investment shock - high versus low oil price regimes. Figure 
shows nonlinear local projection IRFs (LPIRFs) for the effect of a boost in investment on GDP under high (top 
panel) versus low (bottom panel) oil price regimes. The solid line depicts median impulse responses with 95% 
bootstrapped confidence bounds over quarterly time horizon. The impacts are in percentage points
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them on another round of white- elephant projects similar to those of the past few decades, and instead to invest 
their limited resources in longer- term human capital and institutional reforms.
ORCID
Hany Abdel- Latif  https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3810-6807 
F I G U R E  9   LPIRFs of GDP in response to 1SD investment shock - high versus low geopolitical risk regimes. 
Figure shows nonlinear local projection IRFs (LPIRFs) for the effect of a boost in investment on GDP under high 
(top panel) versus low (bottom panel) geopolitical risk regimes. The solid line depicts median impulse responses 
with 95% bootstrapped confidence bounds over quarterly time horizon. The impacts are in percentage points
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APPENDIX A
TA B L E  A 1   Country list
Algeria* Denmark Indonesia Mexico
South 
Korea
Argentina Ecuador Iran* Morocco* Spain
Australia Egypt* Ireland Netherlands Sweden
Austria El Salvador Israel* New Zealand Switzerland
Bahrain* Emirates* Italy Norway Thailand
Belgium Finland Japan Oman* Tunisia*
Brazil France Jordan* Philippines Turkey*
Canada Germany Kuwait* Portugal UK
Chile Greece Lebanon* Qatar* US
China Hungary Luxembourg Saudi Arabia*
Colombia India Malaysia Singapore
Note: Table presents a list of 53 countries in our GVAR model, including 15 countries from the Middle East and North 
Africa region (denoted by *).
F I G U R E  A 1   Oil consumption by country 1990– 2018. Source: Enerdata Energy Statistical Yearbook 2019
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TA B L E  A 2   Oil price regimes diagnostics - Algeria
R- sqrd Adj. R- sqrd F- stat p- value
h1 1.000 1.000 2,059.190 .000
h2 .990 .990 509.070 .000
h3 .990 .980 387.510 .000
h4 .980 .980 269.510 .000
h5 .980 .970 197.170 .000
h6 .970 .960 148.120 .000
h7 .960 .950 118.510 .000
h8 .950 .940 93.780 .000
h9 .940 .930 80.940 .000
h10 .930 .920 66.090 .000
h11 .920 .910 55.880 .000
h12 .910 .900 49.670 .000
h13 .910 .880 44.480 .000
h14 .900 .870 39.900 .000
h15 .890 .870 36.820 .000
h16 .880 .860 34.710 .000
h17 .880 .850 32.810 .000
h18 .870 .850 30.990 .000
h19 .870 .840 29.130 .000
h20 .870 .840 28.320 .000
Note: The table shows OLS diagnostics for 20 quarters horizon for a shock to country level investment.
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TA B L E  A 3   Oil price regimes diagnostics - Bahrain
R- sqrd Adj. R- sqrd F- stat p- value
h1 .960 .960 139.400 .000
h2 .960 .950 128.920 .000
h3 .950 .930 88.100 .000
h4 .950 .930 86.950 .000
h5 .930 .920 71.540 .000
h6 .930 .920 65.500 .000
h7 .930 .910 61.230 .000
h8 .920 .910 57.840 .000
h9 .920 .900 52.220 .000
h10 .900 .880 44.020 .000
h11 .890 .860 36.930 .000
h12 .870 .840 31.060 .000
h13 .850 .820 27.230 .000
h14 .840 .810 24.290 .000
h15 .840 .800 23.660 .000
h16 .840 .800 23.470 .000
h17 .820 .770 19.870 .000
h18 .790 .750 17.030 .000
h19 .760 .710 14.080 .000
h20 .740 .680 12.390 .000
Note: The table shows OLS diagnostics for 20 quarters horizon for a shock to country level investment.
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TA B L E  A 4   Oil price regimes diagnostics - Egypt
R- sqrd Adj. R- sqrd F- stat p- value
h1 .930 .910 65.990 .000
h2 .940 .920 74.140 .000
h3 .920 .900 57.760 .000
h4 .900 .880 46.170 .000
h5 .900 .880 46.620 .000
h6 .860 .840 31.300 .000
h7 .870 .850 33.590 .000
h8 .860 .830 29.680 .000
h9 .840 .810 25.990 .000
h10 .830 .800 23.650 .000
h11 .810 .770 20.670 .000
h12 .790 .750 18.110 .000
h13 .780 .730 16.620 .000
h14 .770 .730 15.870 .000
h15 .760 .710 14.620 .000
h16 .750 .690 13.480 .000
h17 .740 .680 12.930 .000
h18 .730 .670 12.250 .000
h19 .710 .650 10.890 .000
h20 .700 .630 10.230 .000
Note: The table shows OLS diagnostics for 20 quarters horizon for a shock to country level investment.
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TA B L E  A 5   Oil price regimes diagnostics - Emirates
R- sqrd Adj. R- sqrd F- stat p- value
h1 .980 .980 281.150 .000
h2 .970 .960 159.000 .000
h3 .950 .950 106.430 .000
h4 .940 .930 77.700 .000
h5 .930 .910 63.880 .000
h6 .920 .910 58.540 .000
h7 .920 .900 54.270 .000
h8 .910 .900 52.130 .000
h9 .910 .890 50.180 .000
h10 .910 .890 48.210 .000
h11 .910 .890 45.860 .000
h12 .900 .880 41.730 .000
h13 .880 .860 34.450 .000
h14 .870 .840 30.470 .000
h15 .850 .820 27.010 .000
h16 .830 .800 22.860 .000
h17 .830 .790 21.950 .000
h18 .830 .790 21.680 .000
h19 .830 .790 21.400 .000
h20 .830 .790 21.210 .000
Note: The table shows OLS diagnostics for 20 quarters horizon for a shock to country level investment.
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TA B L E  A 6   Oil price regimes diagnostics - Iran
R- sqrd Adj. R- sqrd F- stat p- value
h1 .980 .980 278.400 .000
h2 .970 .960 149.110 .000
h3 .950 .940 90.950 .000
h4 .920 .900 56.770 .000
h5 .900 .880 43.710 .000
h6 .870 .850 34.490 .000
h7 .850 .810 26.830 .000
h8 .820 .780 22.310 .000
h9 .790 .750 18.720 .000
h10 .770 .730 16.270 .000
h11 .750 .690 14.050 .000
h12 .740 .680 13.080 .000
h13 .730 .670 12.720 .000
h14 .730 .670 12.210 .000
h15 .720 .660 11.880 .000
h16 .720 .660 11.590 .000
h17 .720 .660 11.560 .000
h18 .720 .660 11.680 .000
h19 .720 .660 11.500 .000
h20 .720 .660 11.210 .000
Note: The table shows OLS diagnostics for 20 quarters horizon for a shock to country level investment.
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TA B L E  A 7   Oil price regimes diagnostics - Israel
R- sqrd Adj. R- sqrd F- stat p- value
h1 1.000 1.000 10,722.650 .000
h2 1.000 1.000 3,974.400 .000
h3 1.000 1.000 1874.240 .000
h4 1.000 .990 1,047.480 .000
h5 .990 .990 645.270 .000
h6 .990 .990 440.710 .000
h7 .990 .980 338.680 .000
h8 .980 .980 283.840 .000
h9 .980 .980 247.690 .000
h10 .980 .970 226.050 .000
h11 .980 .980 232.570 .000
h12 .980 .980 243.900 .000
h13 .980 .980 262.520 .000
h14 .980 .980 264.440 .000
h15 .980 .980 249.750 .000
h16 .980 .980 220.040 .000
h17 .980 .970 180.350 .000
h18 .970 .970 156.090 .000
h19 .970 .960 144.750 .000
h20 .970 .960 131.620 .000
Note: The table shows OLS diagnostics for 20 quarters horizon for a shock to country level investment.
     |  25ABDEL- LATIF AnD EL- GAMAL
TA B L E  A 8   Oil price regimes diagnostics - Jordan
R- sqrd Adj. R- sqrd F- stat p- value
h1 .990 .980 396.500 .000
h2 .970 .970 186.060 .000
h3 .950 .940 92.690 .000
h4 .920 .910 59.720 .000
h5 .900 .880 46.950 .000
h6 .890 .870 39.380 .000
h7 .880 .860 35.930 .000
h8 .880 .850 34.680 .000
h9 .870 .840 32.750 .000
h10 .870 .840 32.330 .000
h11 .880 .850 33.870 .000
h12 .880 .850 34.650 .000
h13 .880 .850 34.040 .000
h14 .870 .850 32.310 .000
h15 .870 .840 31.400 .000
h16 .860 .830 29.020 .000
h17 .870 .840 29.820 .000
h18 .880 .850 31.860 .000
h19 .890 .860 34.040 .000
h20 .900 .870 37.810 .000
Note: The table shows OLS diagnostics for 20 quarters horizon for a shock to country level investment.
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TA B L E  A 9   Oil price regimes diagnostics - Kuwait
R- sqrd Adj. R- sqrd F- stat p- value
h1 .950 .940 94.660 .000
h2 .950 .940 97.110 .000
h3 .930 .920 72.940 .000
h4 .940 .920 73.640 .000
h5 .930 .910 62.200 .000
h6 .920 .910 58.880 .000
h7 .920 .900 54.070 .000
h8 .910 .890 49.020 .000
h9 .900 .880 45.290 .000
h10 .890 .870 38.910 .000
h11 .880 .850 34.460 .000
h12 .870 .840 30.540 .000
h13 .860 .830 27.970 .000
h14 .840 .810 24.870 .000
h15 .840 .800 23.560 .000
h16 .830 .790 22.330 .000
h17 .820 .780 20.200 .000
h18 .810 .760 18.530 .000
h19 .790 .750 16.850 .000
h20 .780 .730 15.370 .000
Note: The table shows OLS diagnostics for 20 quarters horizon for a shock to country level investment.
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TA B L E  A 1 0   Oil price regimes diagnostics - Lebanon
R- sqrd Adj. R- sqrd F- stat p- value
h1 .920 .900 56.160 .000
h2 .870 .840 33.910 .000
h3 .780 .740 18.530 .000
h4 .700 .640 11.720 .000
h5 .650 .580 9.130 .000
h6 .590 .510 7.220 .000
h7 .550 .460 6.060 .000
h8 .540 .440 5.660 .000
h9 .510 .410 5.110 .000
h10 .510 .410 5.080 .000
h11 .520 .410 5.060 .000
h12 .540 .440 5.420 .000
h13 .550 .460 5.750 .000
h14 .570 .470 6.050 .000
h15 .590 .500 6.540 .000
h16 .600 .510 6.700 .000
h17 .610 .520 6.920 .000
h18 .620 .540 7.420 .000
h19 .630 .550 7.610 .000
h20 .640 .560 7.930 .000
Note: The table shows OLS diagnostics for 20 quarters horizon for a shock to country level investment.
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TA B L E  A 11   Oil price regimes diagnostics - Morocco
R- sqrd Adj. R- sqrd F- stat p- value
hi .990 .990 836.620 000
h2 .990 .990 538.120 .000
h3 .990 .980 363.870 .000
h4 .980 .980 273.280 .000
h5 .980 .980 235.400 .000
h6 .980 .970 211.060 .000
h7 .980 .970 201.560 .000
h8 .970 .970 182.040 .000
h9 .970 .960 146.560 .000
h10 .960 .960 128.810 .000
h11 .960 .950 114.190 .000
h12 .950 .940 92.400 .000
h13 .940 .930 77.070 .000
h14 .940 .920 68.990 .000
h15 .930 .920 64.950 .000
h16 .930 .910 59.540 .000
h17 .920 .910 55.340 .000
h18 .920 .900 51.070 .000
h19 .910 .890 47.050 .000
h20 .910 .890 44.110 .000
Note: The table shows OLS diagnostics for 20 quarters horizon for a shock to country level investment.
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TA B L E  A 1 2   Oil price regimes diagnostics - Oman
R- sqrd Adj. R- sqrd F- stat p- value
h1 .940 .930 85.220 .000
h2 .940 .930 87.140 .000
h3 .930 .920 69.940 .000
h4 .940 .930 78.350 .000
h5 .930 .920 66.420 .000
h6 .930 .910 63.170 .000
h7 .920 .910 58.020 .000
h8 .910 .890 50.210 .000
h9 .910 .900 52.000 .000
h10 .900 .880 45.190 .000
h11 .900 .880 43.330 .000
h12 .890 .870 39.560 .000
h13 .890 .860 36.060 .000
h14 .880 .850 33.050 .000
h15 .880 .850 32.230 .000
h16 .890 .870 37.010 .000
h17 .890 .860 35.600 .000
h18 .880 .850 32.320 .000
h19 .870 .840 29.280 .000
h20 .860 .830 26.570 .000
Note: The table shows OLS diagnostics for 20 quarters horizon for a shock to country level investment.
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TA B L E  A 1 3   Oil price regimes diagnostics - Qatar
R- sqrd Adj. R- sqrd F- stat p- value
h1 .950 .940 93.670 .000
h2 .940 .920 75.250 .000
h3 .920 .900 55.770 .000
h4 .880 .860 37.710 .000
h5 .880 .850 35.820 .000
h6 .870 .840 32.510 .000
h7 .850 .820 28.020 .000
h8 .830 .800 24.610 .000
h9 .820 .780 21.940 .000
h10 .800 .760 19.640 .000
h11 .790 .750 18.190 .000
h12 .780 .740 17.170 .000
h13 .780 .730 16.410 .000
h14 .770 .720 15.780 .000
h15 .770 .720 15.230 .000
h16 .760 .710 14.670 .000
h17 .760 .710 14.300 .000
h18 .760 .700 13.990 .000
h19 .760 .700 13.790 .000
h20 .750 .700 13.310 .000
Note: The table shows OLS diagnostics for 20 quarters horizon for a shock to country level investment.
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TA B L E  A 1 4   Oil price regimes diagnostics - Saudi Arabia
R- sqrd Adj. R- sqrd F- stat p- value
h1 .990 .990 840.640 .000
h2 .990 .990 448.910 .000
h3 .980 .980 268.410 .000
h4 .970 .970 185.230 .000
h5 .970 .960 146.140 .000
h6 .960 .950 123.540 .000
h7 .950 .950 103.900 .000
h8 .950 .940 91.160 .000
h9 .950 .930 83.310 .000
h10 .940 .930 75.810 .000
h11 .930 .920 64.230 .000
h12 .920 .910 56.590 .000
h13 .920 .900 52.720 .000
h14 .910 .890 45.820 .000
h15 .900 .870 39.770 .000
h16 .880 .850 33.440 .000
h17 .870 .840 29.380 .000
h18 .850 .820 25.880 .000
h19 .840 .800 22.730 .000
h20 .820 .780 20.010 .000
Note: The table shows OLS diagnostics for 20 quarters horizon for a shock to country level investment.
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TA B L E  A 1 5   Oil price regimes diagnostics - Tunisia
R- sqrd Adj. R- sqrd F- stat p- value
h1 .990 .990 735.170 .000
h2 .990 .990 485.480 .000
h3 .980 .980 324.430 .000
h4 .980 .970 228.550 .000
h5 .970 .970 168.600 .000
h6 .960 .960 131.650 .000
h7 .960 .950 106.650 .000
h8 .950 .940 90.810 .000
h9 .940 .930 75.420 .000
h10 .930 .910 62.950 .000
h11 .920 .900 52.850 .000
h12 .910 .890 47.370 .000
h13 .900 .880 44.140 .000
h14 .890 .870 38.910 .000
h15 .890 .860 35.890 .000
h16 .880 .860 34.310 .000
h17 .880 .850 32.020 .000
h18 .870 .840 29.860 .000
h19 .870 .840 28.630 .000
h20 .860 .830 27.200 .000
Note: The table shows OLS diagnostics for 20 quarters horizon for a shock to country level investment.
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TA B L E  A 1 6   Oil price regimes diagnostics - Turkey
R- sqrd Adj. R- sqrd F- stat p- value
h1 .990 .990 451.200 .000
h2 .980 .980 313.210 .000
h3 .970 .970 194.440 .000
h4 .960 .950 126.330 .000
h5 .960 .950 110.450 .000
h6 .950 .940 97.720 .000
h7 .950 .940 93.900 .000
h8 .940 .930 80.530 .000
h9 .930 .920 68.970 .000
h10 .930 .910 61.440 .000
h11 .930 .910 60.600 .000
h12 .930 .910 60.990 .000
h13 .930 .910 58.890 .000
h14 .930 .910 57.310 .000
h15 .920 .910 56.120 .000
h16 .920 .910 55.750 .000
h17 .930 .910 57.480 .000
h18 .930 .910 57.740 .000
h19 .930 .910 58.130 .000
h20 .920 .910 53.080 .000
Note: The table shows OLS diagnostics for 20 quarters horizon for a shock to country level investment.
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TA B L E  A 1 7   Geopolitical risk regimes diagnostics - Algeria
R- sqrd Adj. R- sqrd F- stat p- value
h1 1.000 1.000 2,149.640 .000
h2 .990 .990 490.950 .000
h3 .990 .980 375.590 .000
h4 .980 .980 260.120 .000
h5 .970 .970 187.990 .000
h6 .970 .960 140.400 .000
h7 .960 .950 109.560 .000
h8 .950 .930 84.720 .000
h9 .940 .930 73.080 .000
h10 .930 .910 62.110 .000
h11 .920 .900 51.950 .000
h12 .910 .890 45.640 .000
h13 .900 .880 41.220 .000
h14 .890 .860 37.040 .000
h15 .880 .860 34.620 .000
h16 .880 .850 32.600 .000
h17 .870 .840 30.800 .000
h18 .870 .840 29.010 .000
h19 .860 .830 27.780 .000
h20 .860 .830 26.910 .000
Note: The table shows OLS diagnostics for 20 quarters horizon for a shock to country level investment.
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TA B L E  A 1 8   Geopolitical risk regimes diagnostics - Bahrain
R- sqrd Adj. R- sqrd F- stat p- value
h1 .970 .970 175.290 .000
h2 .970 .960 150.150 .000
h3 .960 .950 110.340 .000
h4 .940 .930 84.660 .000
h5 .940 .920 72.630 .000
h6 .920 .900 55.370 .000
h7 .910 .890 48.840 .000
h8 .900 .880 44.280 .000
h9 .890 .870 40.360 .000
h10 .870 .850 33.520 .000
h11 .850 .820 27.990 .000
h12 .830 .790 22.820 .000
h13 .810 .770 20.500 .000
h14 .800 .760 18.500 .000
h15 .790 .740 17.020 .000
h16 .780 .730 15.960 .000
h17 .770 .710 14.710 .000
h18 .760 .710 14.060 .000
h19 .760 .700 13.740 .000
h20 .740 .680 12.280 .000
Note: The table shows OLS diagnostics for 20 quarters horizon for a shock to country level investment.
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TA B L E  A 1 9   Geopolitical risk regimes diagnostics - Egypt
R- sqrd Adj. R- sqrd F- stat p- value
h1 .930 .920 72.060 .000
h2 .930 .920 70.440 .000
h3 .930 .920 73.000 .000
h4 .900 .880 45.180 .000
h5 .910 .900 52.160 .000
h6 .860 .840 31.710 .000
h7 .870 .840 31.810 .000
h8 .850 .820 28.500 .000
h9 .830 .800 24.260 .000
h10 .820 .780 21.600 .000
h11 .800 .760 19.400 .000
h12 .790 .740 17.350 .000
h13 .770 .720 15.540 .000
h14 .760 .710 14.990 .000
h15 .760 .700 14.230 .000
h16 .750 .700 13.910 .000
h17 .750 .690 13.420 .000
h18 .740 .680 12.690 .000
h19 .720 .660 11.300 .000
h20 .700 .640 10.400 .000
Note: The table shows OLS diagnostics for 20 quarters horizon for a shock to country level investment.
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TA B L E  A 2 0   Geopolitical risk regimes diagnostics - Emirates
R- sqrd Adj. R- sqrd F- stat p- value
h1 .980 .980 319.590 .000
h2 .970 .970 179.820 .000
h3 .960 .950 111.610 .000
h4 .940 .930 80.800 .000
h5 .930 .920 66.560 .000
h6 .920 .910 60.910 .000
h7 .920 .900 56.520 .000
h8 .920 .900 53.770 .000
h9 .910 .890 49.700 .000
h10 .910 .890 47.120 .000
h11 .910 .890 45.810 .000
h12 .900 .880 41.230 .000
h13 .890 .860 36.540 .000
h14 .880 .850 32.620 .000
h15 .870 .840 29.500 .000
h16 .850 .820 26.380 .000
h17 .850 .810 24.800 .000
h18 .840 .810 24.000 .000
h19 .840 .810 23.530 .000
h20 .840 .800 22.640 .000
Note: The table shows OLS diagnostics for 20 quarters horizon for a shock to country level investment.
38  |     ABDEL- LATIF AnD EL- GAMAL
TA B L E  A 2 1   Geopolitical risk regimes diagnostics - Iran
R- sqrd Adj. R- sqrd F- stat p- value
h1 .980 .980 266.500 .000
h2 .960 .950 118.120 .000
h3 .930 .920 70.590 .000
h4 .900 .880 43.420 .000
h5 .860 .830 30.120 .000
h6 .830 .800 24.240 .000
h7 .800 .750 19.210 .000
h8 .760 .710 15.680 .000
h9 .730 .670 13.000 .000
h10 .700 .640 11.450 .000
h11 .680 .620 10.330 .000
h12 .660 .590 9.130 .000
h13 .660 .580 8.890 .000
h14 .650 .570 8.540 .000
h15 .640 .560 8.150 .000
h16 .640 .560 8.030 .000
h17 .640 .550 7.840 .000
h18 .640 .560 7.950 .000
h19 .650 .580 8.370 .000
h20 .660 .580 8.450 .000
Note: The table shows OLS diagnostics for 20 quarters horizon for a shock to country level investment.
     |  39ABDEL- LATIF AnD EL- GAMAL
TA B L E  A 2 2   Geopolitical risk regimes diagnostics - Israel
R- sqrd Adj. R- sqrd F- stat p- value
h1 1.000 1.000 9,778.080 .000
h2 1.000 1.000 4,023.020 .000
h3 1.000 1.000 2,002.070 .000
h4 1.000 1.000 1,380.010 .000
h5 .990 .990 821.810 .000
h6 .990 .990 584.430 .000
h7 .990 .990 422.900 .000
h8 .990 .980 342.460 .000
h9 .980 .980 294.970 .000
h10 .980 .980 239.800 .000
h11 .980 .980 225.980 .000
h12 .980 .970 207.890 .000
h13 .980 .970 193.270 .000
h14 .980 .970 194.970 .000
h15 .980 .970 200.200 .000
h16 .980 .970 189.890 .000
h17 .970 .970 171.290 .000
h18 .970 .970 161.530 .000
h19 .970 .960 149.440 .000
h20 .970 .960 137.580 .000
Note: The table shows OLS diagnostics for 20 quarters horizon for a shock to country level investment.
40  |     ABDEL- LATIF AnD EL- GAMAL
TA B L E  A 2 3   Geopolitical risk regimes diagnostics - Jordan
R- sqrd Adj. R- sqrd F- stat p- value
h1 .990 .980 373.850 .000
h2 .970 .970 178.580 .000
h3 .950 .940 89.920 .000
h4 .910 .900 53.050 .000
h5 .890 .870 40.360 .000
h6 .880 .850 35.700 .000
h7 .870 .850 33.450 .000
h8 .870 .850 33.670 .000
h9 .880 .850 34.250 .000
h10 .880 .860 35.570 .000
h11 .880 .860 35.970 .000
h12 .890 .860 36.540 .000
h13 .880 .850 34.310 .000
h14 .870 .840 31.530 .000
h15 .870 .840 30.210 .000
h16 .860 .830 27.450 .000
h17 .860 .830 27.480 .000
h18 .870 .840 29.460 .000
h19 .880 .850 31.040 .000
h20 .880 .860 33.000 .000
Note: The table shows OLS diagnostics for 20 quarters horizon for a shock to country level investment
     |  41ABDEL- LATIF AnD EL- GAMAL
TA B L E  A 2 4   Geopolitical risk regimes diagnostics - Kuwait
R- sqrd Adj. R- sqrd F- stat p- value
h1 .960 .950 109.960 .000
h2 .950 .940 103.350 .000
h3 .950 .930 88.090 .000
h4 .940 .920 73.720 .000
h5 .930 .920 68.110 .000
h6 .920 .900 54.720 .000
h7 .910 .890 48.440 .000
h8 .900 .880 42.700 .000
h9 .890 .870 40.230 .000
10 .880 .850 33.560 .000
11 .860 .840 30.260 .000
12 .850 .810 25.730 .000
13 .840 .800 23.900 .000
14 .820 .780 21.340 .000
15 .810 .770 20.180 .000
16 .800 .750 17.930 .000
17 .790 .750 17.390 .000
18 .780 .730 15.940 .000
19 .780 .730 15.870 .000
20 .770 .720 14.780 .000
Note: The table shows OLS diagnostics for 20 quarters horizon for a shock to country level investment.
42  |     ABDEL- LATIF AnD EL- GAMAL
TA B L E  A 2 5   Geopolitical risk regimes diagnostics - Lebanon
R- sqrd Adj. R- sqrd F- stat p- value
h1 .930 .910 65.790 .000
h2 .900 .880 45.920 .000
h3 .830 .800 25.300 .000
h4 .770 .720 16.490 .000
h5 .710 .650 12.150 .000
h6 .650 .580 9.360 .000
h7 .620 .540 8.030 .000
h8 .590 .510 7.130 .000
h9 .570 .490 6.510 .000
h10 .550 .450 5.810 .000
h11 .540 .440 5.570 .000
h12 .550 .450 5.720 .000
h13 .560 .470 5.970 .000
h14 .560 .460 5.880 .000
h15 .560 .460 5.760 .000
h16 .540 .440 5.350 .000
h17 .560 .460 5.690 .000
h18 .540 .440 5.300 .000
h19 .550 .450 5.370 .000
h20 .580 .490 6.130 .000
Note: The table shows OLS diagnostics for 20 quarters horizon for a shock to country level investment.
     |  43ABDEL- LATIF AnD EL- GAMAL
TA B L E  A 2 6   Geopolitical risk regimes diagnostics - Morocco
R- sqrd Adj. R- sqrd F- stat p- value
h1 .990 .990 839.240 .000
h2 .990 .990 537.590 .000
h3 .990 .980 334.530 .000
h4 .980 .980 249.970 .000
h5 .970 .970 193.020 .000
h6 .970 .960 164.490 .000
h7 .970 .960 143.220 .000
h8 .960 .950 123.450 .000
h9 .960 .950 103.350 .000
h10 .950 .940 86.050 .000
h11 .940 .930 74.350 .000
h12 .930 .920 62.670 .000
h13 .920 .910 56.430 .000
h14 .920 .900 51.530 .000
h15 .910 .900 48.720 .000
h16 .910 .890 43.870 .000
h17 .900 .880 41.840 .000
h18 .900 .870 39.160 .000
h19 .890 .870 36.250 .000
h20 .890 .870 35.750 .000
Note: The table shows OLS diagnostics for 20 quarters horizon for a shock to country level investment.
44  |     ABDEL- LATIF AnD EL- GAMAL
TA B L E  A 2 7   Geopolitical risk regimes diagnostics - Oman
R- sqrd Adj. R- sqrd F- stat p- value
h1 .950 .940 98.800 .000
h2 .950 .940 93.840 .000
h3 .940 .930 86.120 .000
h4 .940 .930 81.510 .000
h5 .940 .930 80.730 .000
h6 .920 .900 53.520 .000
h7 .900 .880 45.970 .000
h8 .890 .870 41.440 .000
h9 .890 .860 38.220 .000
h10 .880 .850 33.730 .000
h11 .870 .840 31.280 .000
h12 .850 .820 26.950 .000
h13 .850 .810 25.460 .000
h14 .830 .800 23.380 .000
h15 .820 .780 20.800 .000
h16 .820 .780 20.850 .000
h17 .830 .790 21.520 .000
h18 .820 .780 19.890 .000
h19 .820 .780 19.720 .000
h20 .820 .770 19.470 .000
Note: The table shows OLS diagnostics for 20 quarters horizon for a shock to country level investment.
     |  45ABDEL- LATIF AnD EL- GAMAL
TA B L E  A 2 8   Geopolitical risk regimes diagnostics - Qatar
R- sqrd Adj. R- sqrd F- stat p- value
h1 .960 .960 136.910 .000
h2 .950 .940 104.250 .000
h3 .940 .930 82.060 .000
h4 .890 .870 40.890 .000
h5 .860 .840 31.620 .000
h6 .840 .800 25.160 .000
h7 .820 .780 21.930 .000
h8 .800 .760 20.060 .000
h9 .790 .750 18.240 .000
h10 .780 .740 17.400 .000
h11 .780 .730 16.490 .000
h12 .770 .720 15.840 .000
h13 .760 .710 15.010 .000
h14 .760 .710 14.810 .000
h15 .760 .700 14.220 .000
h16 .750 .700 13.810 .000
h17 .760 .700 14.140 .000
h18 .770 .720 14.950 .000
h19 .780 .730 15.400 .000
h20 .770 .720 14.660 .000
Note: The table shows OLS diagnostics for 20 quarters horizon for a shock to country level investment.
46  |     ABDEL- LATIF AnD EL- GAMAL
TA B L E  A 2 9   Geopolitical risk regimes diagnostics - Saudi Arabia
R- sqrd Adj. R- sqrd F- stat p- value
h1 .990 .990 908.140 .000
h2 .990 .990 451.920 .000
h3 .980 .970 237.700 .000
h4 .970 .960 142.290 .000
h5 .950 .940 102.640 .000
h6 .940 .930 80.480 .000
h7 .930 .910 64.260 .000
h8 .910 .900 52.420 .000
h9 .900 .880 44.750 .000
h10 .890 .860 37.520 .000
h11 .870 .840 31.690 .000
h12 .850 .820 27.020 .000
h13 .830 .800 23.290 .000
h14 .810 .770 19.950 .000
h15 .790 .740 17.090 .000
h16 .770 .710 14.820 .000
h17 .740 .690 13.030 .000
h18 .720 .660 11.450 .000
h19 .700 .630 10.130 .000
h20 .670 .600 8.920 .000
Note: The table shows OLS diagnostics for 20 quarters horizon for a shock to country level investment.
     |  47ABDEL- LATIF AnD EL- GAMAL
TA B L E  A 3 0   Geopolitical risk regimes diagnostics - Tunisia
R- sqrd Adj. R- sqrd F- stat p- value
h1 .990 .990 797.470 .000
h2 .990 .990 522.870 .000
h3 .990 .980 346.480 .000
h4 .980 .980 239.310 .000
h5 .970 .960 165.330 .000
h6 .960 .960 132.440 .000
h7 .950 .950 102.970 .000
h8 .950 .930 83.800 .000
h9 .940 .920 70.360 .000
h10 .920 .910 59.040 .000
h11 .910 .900 51.050 .000
h12 .910 .880 44.930 .000
h13 .900 .880 41.150 .000
h14 .890 .870 37.310 .000
h15 .880 .850 33.670 .000
h16 .870 .840 31.050 .000
h17 .870 .840 28.850 .000
h18 .860 .830 27.020 .000
h19 .850 .820 25.350 .000
h20 .850 .820 24.750 .000
Note: The table shows OLS diagnostics for 20 quarters horizon for a shock to country level investment.
48  |     ABDEL- LATIF AnD EL- GAMAL
TABLE A31 Geopolitical risk regimes diagnostics - Turkey
R- sqrd Adj. R- sqrd F- stat p- value
h1 .990 .990 532.260 .000
h2 .980 .980 303.530 .000
h3 .970 .970 177.430 .000
h4 .960 .950 107.700 .000
h5 .950 .940 91.830 .000
h6 .940 .930 85.010 .000
h7 .940 .930 79.120 .000
h8 .940 .930 77.110 .000
h9 .940 .920 70.650 .000
h10 .930 .920 65.440 .000
h11 .930 .910 60.150 .000
h12 .920 .910 57.340 .000
h13 .920 .900 51.450 .000
h14 .910 .890 48.880 .000
h15 .910 .890 47.360 .000
h16 .920 .900 50.470 .000
h17 .920 .900 51.700 .000
h18 .930 .910 55.240 .000
h19 .930 .910 54.690 .000
h20 .920 .900 50.760 .000
Note: The table shows OLS diagnostics for 20 quarters horizon for a shock to country level investment.
